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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
AND THE CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
Donna Greschner
L'article 15(2) de la Charte des droits et liber-
tes protege les programmes d'action positive
de ['invalidation constitutionnelle. Donna
Greschner demande si la Charte sera un
obstacle, un atout, ou sans consequence dans
l'introduction des programmes d'action
positive.
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms,l
as part of the Constitution of Canada,
provides new legal standards against
which to measure the activities of
governments. 2 Will the Charter be a
hindrance, a help, or an irrelevance in the
implementation of affirmative action
programs? I will consider affirmative
action programs specifically geared to
women, although the arguments will be
applicable generally.
Affirmative action programs are justi-
fied as methods of achieving equality. The
Charter speaks directly to equality and
affirmative action in section 15, Equality
Rights. 3 Subsection (2) appears with the
marginal note of "affirmative action
programs" (in the French version, "pro-
grammes de promotion sociale"):
15.(1) Every individual is equal before and
under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law with-
out discrimination and, in particular, with-
out discrimination based on race, national
or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any
law, program or activity that has as its
object the amelioration of conditions of
disadvantaged individuals or groups,
including those that are disadvantaged
because of race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability.
The. inclusion of subsection (2)
stemmed from a concern that the courts
might interpret the rights to equality in
subsection (1) in such a way as to render
unconstitutional affirmative action
programs.
One long-recognized type of inequality
now carries the rubric of "facial in-
equality." As between women and men,
it occurs when a law expressly
creates an extra burden or confers an extra
benefit on only one sex. An example
which affected our foremothers was the
law that denied women the right to vote in
federal elections. Simply reading the
words of the statute reveals the unequal
treatment - it is obvious on the face of the
law. There is no doubt that facial in-
equality has been a problem, and that
typically its cure is, as with the vote, to
treat women and men in an identical
manner. But if the courts interpreted the
rights to equal benefit and equal protec-
tion as always requiring identical treat-
ment, affirmative action programs would
be impermissible because they involve
preferential treatment of disadvantaged
groups and individuals. The provisions of
human rights legislation in many jurisdic-
tions which authorize the imposition of
affirmative action programs would be
vulnerable to attack, without subsection
(2), as an unconstitutional infringement of
equality.
One function, therefore, of subsection
(2) is to protect affirmative action
programs from constitutional invalida-
tion. The protection is a recognition that
identical treatment of persons does not
always achieve equality. If persons are
unequal to begin with, treating them in an
identical manner serves to maintain the
inequality. With subsection (2), if specific
affirmative action programs or the provi-
sions in human rights legislation authoriz-
ing mandatory programs are challenged
in the courts, subsection (1) cannot be
interpreted to "preclude" the program or
law. The impugned law or program need
only satisfy the criteria of subsection (2)
that is, its object must be the amelioration
of the conditions of disadvantaged groups
or individuals. Thus, subsection (2) assists
women in the attainment of equality by
permitting the continued use of affirma-
tive action programs.
Several commentators have expressed
the fear that subsection (2) will also be
utilized by the almost exclusively male
judiciary to uphold paternalistic, facially
unequal laws which appear to them to be
beneficial to women. 4 The history of
women and the legal system is rife with
examples of laws justified as benefitting
women which in fact were based on
stereotyped assumptions about the abili-
ties and proper role of women, and which
served to perpetuate women's inferior
social and economic position. 5 The slip-
pery phrase "amelioration of conditions"
could now be interpreted in such a way as
to shield such laws from constitutional
scrutiny. From the gloomiest viewpoint,
subsection (2) may become more of a de-
triment than an advantage for women.
This fear is not a compelling reason to
bemoan - or ignore - the existence of sub-
section (2). The danger of any law being
deployed for malevolent or undesirable
ends always exists. Moreover, such a
disastrous interpretation for women can
be justly condemned as inconsistent with
the principle of equality enunciated by the
opening words of subsection (1), and with
the principle of sexual equality underlying
section 28 of the Charter. It can be strongly
argued that subsection (2) is designed to
realize equality by permitting programs
that will help the members of an unequal
group become equal. Paternalistic legisla-
tion does not contain the positive steps
necessary to attain equality.
One method of ensuring that sub-
section (2) does not thwart the pursuit of
equality relates to the evidence presented
in support of the contention that a facially
unequal law is protected by the subsec-
tion. One can expect statistics, sociological
studies and economic analysis to be intro-
duced as evidence to prove that women
are in a disadvantaged condition, and that
the law will ameliorate that condition. The
research and studies themselves cannot
be based on sexist assumptions about the
roles of women and men. We should
argue that all evidence of this type be
scrutinized for gender bias before being
accepted as evidence by the courts. 6
Section 28, which states that all rights and
freedoms are guaranteed equally to
female and male persons, supports in
principle our demand. How can courts
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decide if rights and freedoms are being
guaranteed equally if the evidence on·
which a decision is based is skewed
against women? As well, to admit sex-
biased evidence into court can by itself be
a violation of equality before and under
the law pursuant to section 15(1).
In the end, if our arguments about the
interpretation and evidence required for
subsection (2) are not accepted by the
judiciary, then we must criticize loudly
and publicly the approach and personnel
of the courts.
To conclude that subsection (2) is a pro-
tection for affirmative action programs
does not, of course, impose by itself any
obligation on governments to establish
more programs or enact legislation with
tougher affirmative action requirements-
tougher, that is, that the Employment
Equity Act introduced in Parliament in
June 1985. The Charter does not erase the
need to pressure governments in the
political forum. Subsection (2) was in-
cluded in the expectation that affirmative
action programs would be implemented
by governments, and women must
ensure that governments fulfill that
expectation.
But subsection (2) alone, with its per-
mission for affirmative action programs, is
not the end of the story about the Charter
and affirmative action programs for
women. A further question is whether or
not the courts can order affirmative action
programs as a remedy for violation of the
equality rights. In other words, can the
court impose, through subsection (1), an
obligation on governments to establish
specific programs? This question raises
more complicated issues about the inter-
pretation of the Charter and the capacities
of the courts.
As a matter of principle a remedy is
what an affirmative action program is all
about - it is a remedial measure designed
to correct the disadvantages suffered in
the past by individuals and groups.
Courts, besides retaining an inherent
remedial power, have been given in sec-
tion 24 of the Charter a very broad power
to grant remedies that are "appropriate
and just in the circumstances." However,
an argument is made for excluding
programs as within the court's remedial
power on the grounds that because the
rights in subsection (1) are given to indi-
viduals, the remedies can only compensate
individuals whose rights have been
violated. Affirmative action, it is then
noted, is a group remedy in that some
beneficiaries of a program may not have
actually suffered a specific infringementof
their rights. But it can be pointed out that
remedies often ensure that illegal activity
does not persist in the future. One effica-
cious method of preventing an indefinite
stream of individuals complaining of
similar violations of specific rights is to
correct permanently the situation which is
causing the infringment by invoking a
group remedy, such as an affirmative
action program.
More importantly, subsection (1) also
uses the language of groups. Persons
have the rights to equal protection and
equal benefit without discrimination on
the basis of certain characteristics such as
sex or race. The message is that indi-
viduals can be and have been denied
equality because of their membership in
groups. Since group membership can
cause inequality, it is not inconsistent for a
court to order a group remedy such as
affirmative action.
If the courts have the power to order
affirmative action programs (and nothing
in the Charter compels the opposite
conclusion), the next question is when the
courts will uSe the power. Affirmative
action programs become more appropri-
ate as remedies if the scope of the rights in
subsection (1) is extended beyond facial
inequality. Another type of inequality
now commonly bears the label of
"systemic inequality." It refers to a facially
neutral law or program which has an
adverse and disproportionate impact on a
particular group, such as women. The
classic example is height and weight
requirements for specific jobs which
exclude most women and include most
men. The inequality is in the operation of
the rules rather than on the face of the
rules.
No one would dispute that subsection
(1) is aimed at facial inequality. But
whether or not subsection (1) also pro-
hibits systemic inequality is a more
controversial question. On the positive
side, an argument can be made that the
phrase "equal benefit" requires an
examination of the impact or effect of a
law. How can one decide if two persons or
two groups have received the equal
benefit of a law unless there is a scrutiny of
the effects of the law on each one? The
right to equal benefit can be interpreted to
encompass a prohibition on "neutral"
laws with adverse and disproportionate
effects on a group.
Women must argue strenuously that
systemic inequality is within the compass
of subsection (1) because such inequality
is by far the most pervasive form today
(when very few laws still expressly
burden women) and has the gravest eco-
nomic consequences for women. For
example, the tragic financial plightofmost
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single elderly women can be attributed in
large part to systemic inequality in
pension laws.7
If systemic inequality is covered by sub-
section (1), then not only do the opportu-
nities for court-ordered affirmative action
programs increase dramatically, but the
arguments for imposing programs
assume greater cogency. Consider a city
whose height and weight requirements
for certain jobs are held to constitute sys-
temic inequality against women. The
finding of inequality, that is the breach of
subsection (1) rights, stems from the
adverse and disporportionate effect the
employment requirements have on
women as a group. Any complaint of sys-
temic inequality by an individual is group-
based in that it is the treatment of the
group to which the individual belongs
that is the subject-matter of the complaint.
Systemic inequality is inherently group-
based and demands a group-based
remedy, such as affirmative action pro-
grams. Indeed, for a court Simply to strike
down the unconstitutional requirements
and not impose a program would mean
that the effects of the old requirements on
the employment of women as a group
would not be ameliorated for many years,
if ever. And justice delayed is justice
denied.
Courts may be still reluctant to order
affirmative-action programs because of
their lack of expertise in designing and
monitoring the programs. The problem is
one of the capacity of the courts, and
could be addressed in some jurisdictions
at least by close cooperation between the
courts and the human rights commis-
sions. Several commissions have valuable
experience that can be drawn upon in for-
mulating court orders. But even if courts
hesitate to use their power, the threat
alone of an imposed affirmative action
program could in some cases convince a
recalcitrant government to implement a
program voluntarily.
In conclusion, it appears that the
Charter can be of assistance in the imple-
mentation of affirmative action programs
for women. Space has forestalled full con-
sideration of the objections which could
be made to the utilization of the programs
as a court-ordered remedy. Objections
also could be voiced against the view that
systemic inequality is prohibited by the
Charter. Women will need to counter
such arguments in the courts.
Several hopeful indications exist that
the courts will accept that systemic
inequality is encompassed by section 15.
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal has
recently interpreted the Saskatchewan
Human Rights Code as prohibiting syste-
mic inequality. 8 Several contrary decisions
from other courts on the scope of other
human rights legislation are on appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada.9 Since the
Supreme Court refused leave to appeal
from the Saskatchewan decision, the
optimistic prediction can be offered that
the Supreme Court will follow the
Saskatchewan example when it renders
judgment in the other two cases.
If systemic inequality is within the
ambit of human rights legislation, the
likelihood is increased that the courts will
adopt similar reasoning in interpreting the
Charter. Moreover, in one of the first
Charter decisions from the Supreme
Court, Chief Justice Dickson stated that
the effects of a law must be analysed in
assessing its constitutionality.1O Such an
approach when laws are challenged
under section 15 could lead to a pro-
hibition of systemic inequality. But these
are small signs of hope, and none
yet are visible for affirmative action
programs. 11
What the Charter will mean for women
depends on the interpretations selected
by the courts. Women, who participated
in the formulation of the Charter, cannot
allow it to be given legal meaning without
their input. We must press for the inter-
pretations we want of the equality rights
and affirmative action. But the specific
interpretations we want will be deter-
mined by our general vision of equality.
Equality is, to borrow philosophical termi-
nology, an essentially-contested concept,
with different conceptions of equality
spanning the full range of social and
political theories. Interpretations of
section 15 will be determined by these
conceptions.
Women must not turn the dialogue of
equality over to the lawyers and judges;
they possess no special expertise as social
theorists. Nor should we focus our
resources exclusively on the courts and
the Charter, because governments can do
much more to realize our vision. The
Charter adds a new legal dimension to
the broad and critical debate about the
meaning and methods of equality.
IThe Charter is Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, as enacted by the Canada Act,
1982, c. 11, (U.K.). Quebec has never
signed the constitutional accord which
produced the Charter and although sub-
ject to the Charter has opted out of section
2 and 7 to 15 by using the section 33 over-
ride power. Hence, the arguments based
on section 15 are not available in Quebec.
2Whether or not the Charter also covers
private activity is debatable. See Brian
Slattery, "Charter of Rights and Freedoms
- Does It Bind Private Persons?" (1985), 63
Canadian Bar Review 148 and citations
therein.
3Section 6, Mobility Rights, also has an
affirmative action provision available for
economically depressed provinces, but it
will not be considered herein.
4See, for example, Wendy Williams,
"Sex Discrimination Under the Charter:
Some Problems ofTheory" (1983), 4 Cana-
dian Human Rights Reporter C/83-1, at
C/83-7.
SFor examples from countries other than
Canada, see Albie Sachs and Joan Hoff
Wilson, Sexism and the Law (Oxford:
Martin Robertson, 1978).
6Publications such as Margrit Eichler
and Jeanne Lapointe, On the Treatment of
the Sexes in Research (Ottawa:
S.S.H.R.C.C., 1985), can be used to
analyse research for sex-related bias.
7Report on the Statute Audit Project
(Toronto: Charter of Rights Educational
Fund, 1985), pp. 8.1 - 8.49.
8Canadian Odeon Theatres v. Saskatchewan
Human Rights Commission, [1985] 3 Western
Weekly Reports 717.
9C.N.R. v. Bhinder (1983), 48 National
Reporter 81 (Federal Court of Appeal); Re
Ontario Human Rights Commission and
Simpsons-Sears (1983), 138 Dominion Law
Reports (3d) 133 (Ont. Court of Appeal).
IOR. v. Big M Drug Mart (1985), 58
National Reporter 81.
11For a negative sign, see the decision of
the Federal Court of Appeal in C.N.R. v.
Canadian Human Rights Commission and
Action Travail des Femmes, July 16, 1985.
Leave to appeal has been sought from the
Supreme Court of Canada.
Donna Greschner, who teaches constitu-
tionallaw at the University of Saskatchewan,
thanks her colleagues Beth Bilson and Eric
Colvin for commenting on adraft ofthis article.
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